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SOME COPYRIGHT ASPECTS OF NEW ART: POP GOES
THE EASEL
1. INTRODUCTION
Under the present Copyright Act, protection is afforded to artistic as
well as to literary encleavors, 1 Although this coverage was originally limited tofine arts,2
 since 1909 it has involved a wider spectrum called "works of art." 3
In this category are included paintings, drawings and sculpture, the works
traditionally associated with the fine arts, as well as areas of artistic crafts-
manship? In the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has further expanded
the coverage of the Act by the inclusion of utilitarian objects of artistic
value.5
 Thus, copyright protection is now available for a wide variety of
works, provided only that the requirements of the Copyright Act be complied
with, and that there he some creative artistry involved. 6 In the past few
years, however, a new art form has emerged which not only has revolution-
ized art, but also may create numerous problems under the copyright law.
This new form of art has been labeled "pop art." 7 For its subject mat-
ter it draws upon commercial artifacts and commonplace objects. 8 The spe-
cific materials depicted in pop art come from an assortment of sources
reflective of contemporary culture; thus, artists have made paintings and
three-dimensional works consisting entirely of such common objects as Camp,
bell Soup cans and Grillo hoxes, 9 comic strip frames,'° road signs, 11 and
bronzed beer cans.1:4 All these works have in common the fact that they are
adapted from previously existing subject matter which, because it is man-
made and commercial in nature, may itself be protected by the copyright law.
This comment will consider whether pop art may constitute an infringement
of its commercial origin, pop's own potential copyrightability as art, and
whether pop art can itself be infringed by the recent trend of major com-
panies to market pop art objects commercially.
Copyright Act § 5, 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1964), provides that one of the classes of
copyrightable materials includes works of art and models or designs for works of art.
2 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212.
3 See Note, Protection for the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility, 72 Harv. L.
Rev. 1520, 1524 (1959).
4 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1968).
Id. Sec Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
0 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (1968).
7 "Pop art" is a British term, coined in reference to the sources of the art, rather
that to its popular appeal. L.R. Lippard, Pop Art 79-80 (1966).
8 See M. Amaya, Pop Art 	 And After 11 (1965).
° Works of Andy Warhol, in id. at 103.
to Works of Roy Lichtenstein, in J. Rublowsky, Pop Art 5 (1965).
11 Works of Robert Indiana, in M. Amaya, supra note 8, at 45.
12
 Work of Jasper Johns, ,in 5ccider, Folklore of the Banal, 50 Art in America 56,
58 (1962).
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TI. POP ART AS INFRINGEMENT
Since pop art employs artificially produced objects, rather than nat-
ural subjects, much of the original material is eligible for copyright pro-
tection. For some pop art, such as oversized plastic hamburgers, no problem
of infringement exists, as it is derived from uncopyrightable sources. Any
use of copyrighted material, however, may constitute infringement, even
though the use is for a legitimate artistic purpose. Unlike the charge of trade-
mark infringement, where the test employed is actual or potential confusion,
all that is required for copyright infringement is an improper copying or
plagiarism of a substantial part of the copyrighted work." Under the Copy-
right Act, protection is specifically afforded to such pop art subjects as com-
mercial labels,14 which artist Andy Warhol has depicted, and comic strips,"
upon which artist Roy Lichtenstein bases much of his work. One example
of such copying was an exact reproduction by Roy Lichtenstein of a diagram
of a Cezanne painting which had been used in a text book for instructional
purposes.'" This precision of copying without any changes is also evident in
Lichtenstein's comic strip frames." Many other sources of pop art are also
subject to copyright protection, so that the use of these objects in a pop
work may well be an infringement.
Even though a particular pop work technically infringes a copyright of
its source material, the artist's use may constitute a "fair use," and thereby
provide a defense." The doctrine of fair use arises from the essential nature
of copyright protection. It is entirely equitable in nature, and thus defies
concise definition. Because of his contribution, a copyright holder is granted
the exclusive right to copy what he has created." This right cannot be so
exclusive, however, as to exclude others from using part of his contribution
in the pursuit of further progress. 2° Ultimately, then, the protection provided
by the copyright law must be balanced against the necessity for further ad-
19 See Derenberg, Commercial Prints And Labels: A Hybrid In Copyright Law, 49
Yale L.J. 1212, 1223 (1940). Contra, William Faehndrich, Inc. v. Wheeler Riddle Cheese
Co,, 34 F.2d 43, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
14 Copyright Act § 5(k), 17 U.S.C. § 5(k) (1964).
17' Id. § 5(g), 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1964).
16 The artist who originally made the diagram for the textbook has complained that
he never received any part of the .$2C00 which Lichtenstein obtained for the copy of it.
See Loran, Pop artists or copy cats?, 62 Art News, Nov., 1963, at 48.
17 See id. at 61, where the author reproduced two pictures, one a copy from
William Overgard's Steve Roper of August 6, 1961, the other a virtually identical painting
by Lichtenstein.
18 Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ;
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). See M. Nimmer,
Copyright § 144 (1968).
19 Copyright Act § 1, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), provides that
fairly person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title,
shall have the exclusive right:
(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work....
2,0 See Yankwich, What Is Fair Use? 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203, 215 (1954).
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vancement of science or the arts. 21 As a result, what is technically infringing
is allowed because of the reasonableness of the appropriation. 22
The question whether a particular appropriation constitutes a fair use
is dependent upon the facts of each case. 22 When the use is for a further
development of the fine arts, the balancing in favor of progress results in
the broadest possible scope for fair use. 24 Three major factors are considered
in a fair use determination: the nature and purpose of the selection, the
quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use
may compete or interfere with the sale of the original work. 23 in pop art
appropriation, the quantity of the original taken is substantial, but the other
factors operate against any conclusion of infringement. 28 There is an absence
of any competition or injurious effect resulting from the incorporation into
pop art. In fact, the appropriation is probably beneficial to the original, in
that it both glamorizes the product and provides free advertising. The pur-
pose of the selection is to advance fine art, the very reason for allowing fair
use as a defense. 27
In view of the purpose of advancing the arts and of the absence of any
adverse effect upon the original source, it is submitted that the incorporation
of protected materials by pop artists is a legitimate fair use, and thus that
pop art cannot be considered an infringement of its man-made origin. 28
III. COPYRIGHTABILITY OF POP ART
As with other types of creative endeavors, the pop artist may wish to
protect his work by copyrighting it. Any artistic work is entitled to pro-
tection if it meets the requirements of copyrightability for its class. 23 Thus
21 See Sayre v. Moore (sittings after Hil. 1785, at Guildhall, cor. Lord Mansfield
C.J.), reported in Cary v. Longman, 102 Eng. Rep, 139, 140 n,b (K.B. 1801).
22 Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165, 174- (S.D. Cal.
1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (equally divided court).
23 Karl v. Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837 (El). Wis. 1941).
24 Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165, 175-76 (S.D. Cal.
1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (equally divided court).
See Henry Holt & Co. ex rel. Felderman v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302,
304 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
23 Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837 (ED. Wis. 1941) ; New York
Tribune, Inc. v. Otis & Co., 39 F. Supp. 67 (S.D,N.Y. 1941). See also Yankwich, supra
note 20, at 213.
25 See American Institute of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146, 147 (S.D.N.Y.
1941).
27 See 994 supra.
28 Under the proposed Copyright Law Revision, there would be allowances for
fair use in the statute itself. H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107 (1967). A definition
of fair use is included, limiting it to purposes of criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, or research. Id. Under this definition, it is uncertain whether pop
art usage would qualify as "scholarship" so as to allow fair use as a defense, even though
the avowed purpose of the section is not to narrow the definition. See Time, Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 195S) .
29 See Copyright Act § 5(g), 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1964).
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a pop art work, to be eligible for copyright, must, in addition to complying
with statutory procedures, exhibit both creativity and, originality
Creative authorship is necessary as a matter of legal definition to copy-
right works of art; without it, there is no work of art.'q Conversely, if a par,
ticular work is capable of classification as a "work of art," then it should be
able to satisfy the copyright requirement for creativity."2 Under this standard
for creativity, the courts have been very liberal in construing what can be
classified as a work of art, and is thereby eligible for copyright protection.
in Rosenthal v. Stein,"" the court stated that a work of art is anything that
"appears to be within the historical and ordinary conception of the term
art."'" When it first developed, pop art might not . have qualified even under
this broad guideline, as its status as art had been questioned by leading art
authorities."'" Now, however, it is generally recognized that pop art is a form
of art,36
 though divergent opinions exist as to whether pop is a natural devel-
opment from earlier art movements, such as abstract expressionisna, 37 or is
a complete rejection of the direction of all previous artistic development.'"
Its source should be irrelevant, however, as pop art unquestionably relates
in some way, either positively or negatively, to the historical conception of
the term art. Thus pop art, at least for copyright purposes, constitutes "art."
It is still conceivable that pop art may be denied copyright protection
because of the lowly nature of its subject matter. The trend in the law towards
definitional liberalization, however, minimizes this possibility. Relative artistic
merit has been held to be immaterial in determining copyright eligibility."
in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.," Justice Holmes stated that
[c] ertainly works are not the less connected with the fine arts because the
pictorial quality attracts the crowds. ..." 41 Justice Holmes also urged judicial
restraint in questions of artistic merit:
[i j t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At
the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appre,
ciation.42
3 ° Trade Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). See M. Nimmer, Copyright § 19 (1968).
31 Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovitz, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776, 781 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
32
 See M. Nimmer, Copyright § 19.1 (1968).
33 205 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1953).
414 Id. at 635. See United States v. Perry, 146 U.S. 71 (1892), where the Court at-
tempted to define art.
35 See Loran, supra note 16; Hess, Pop And Public, 62 Art News, Nov., 1963, at 23.
36
 Hess, supra note 35.
37 See J. Rublowsky, supra note 10, at 4; M. Amaya, supra note 8, at 45.
38 M. Amaya, supra note 8, at 45.
39 Trifari, Krussman & Fishel v. Chard Co., 134 F. Supp. 551, 552 (S.D.N.Y, 1955).
In Pellegrini v. Allegrini, 2 F.2d 610, 611 (E.D. Pa. 1924), the court stated that art works
may "have a high order of [artistic] merit, or none at all . ." and still be entitled to
copyright protection.
4 ° 188 U.S. 239 (1903). This case involved circus posters.
41 Id, at 251.
42 Id.
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The obvious limit mentioned was reached in Bailie v. Fisher,'" when the
court found that a cardboard star with two flaps which enabled it to stand
was simply not a work of art. 44 Whatever artistic merit may inhere in pop
art, it certainly exceeds that of a cardboard star, as it is clearly artistic in
both thought and execution. 4 .5 Because of this artistic nature, pop art should
be able to satisfy the creativity requirements of the copyright law.
In addition to being creative, pop art must also be "original" to be eligi-
ble for copyright protection." While creativity refers to the nature of the
work itself, originality turns upon the artist's contribution to the work. 47 In
this context, originality means simply that the artist has created it by his
own skill, labor and judgment. 45
 The necessary degree of orginality under
this requirement is quite modest. Unlike patents, copyrights require no novelty
or invention 4° Instead, the test that has evolved for originality is merely a
determination whether the work is the result of independent labor, or is merely
a copy of , the work of another!'
SinceTmch of pop art is virtually an exact copy of existing material,"
it is questionable whether pop is sufficiently original to be copyrightable. If
originality were based solely upon the material content of the work, pop art
simply would not qualify. In this respect, the direction taken by the law has
created an impediment to protection of the art form. Though the statutory
provisions of the Copyright Act make no specific mention of a material orig-
inality requirement,Si the Register of Copyrights has created such a legal bar-
rier in his regulations," and the courts have accepted this as a legal pre-
requisite." The concept of pop art, however, is based upon the precision of the
copying and the fact that the use as art signifies something more than the
simple representation of the object itself." It is this aspect of pop art that
makes it unique; it is original because of the use of copied, unoriginal
material."
This apparent conflict between law and art may be resolved under a
43 258 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
44 Id. at 426.
45 See Louis DeJonge & Co. v. Brooker & Kessler Co., 182 F. 150 (S.E.D. Pa. 1910),
aff'd, 191 F. 35 (3d Cir. 1911), aff'd, 235 U.S. 33 (1914).
45 Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovitz, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) ; Surgical Supply Serv., Inc. v. Adler, 206 F. Supp. 564 (F.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd on
other grounds, 321 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1963) ; Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197
F. Supp. 940, 944 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962).
47 See M. Nimmer, Copyright § 19.2 (1968).
48 Alfred Bell & Co., v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) ;
Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 117 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
4° Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Gerlach-Barklow Co. v.
Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927).
3 ° Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, '117 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; Jones
Bros. Co. v. Underkoffer, 16 F. Supp. 729, 731 (M.D. Pa. 1936).
51
 See p. 993 supra.
52 See Copyright Act § 4, 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
53 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (1968) provides that "Mn order to be acceptable as a
work of art, the work must embody some creative authorship in its delineation or form."
54 See cases cited note 46 supra.
55 M. Amaya, supra note 8, at 11; Hess, supra note 35.
55 M. Amaya, supra note 8, at 18.
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broad interpretation of originality. To a limited extent, orginality is already
considered dependent upon the field of endeavor in which protection is sought."
In the field of art, originality should not be given a narrow interpretation
based upon material content, but should include new forms of expression of
existing subject matter. 58
 Under this broadened definition, there could exist
either creative originality for the first work of a kind, or mere resourcefulness
for the derivation of the work from an original source." Clearly the artist exer-
cises more skill and judgment in the production of pop art than does the
photographer in photographic production. Since a simple photograph is suffi-
ciently original for copyright purposes," the use of an object, even a copied
object, as an art form should also qualify. In such an instance, the trans-
formation of the object is the artist's idea, and his individual effort makes
it art.
Perhaps the most difficult situation for finding pop art to be original
arises from the works of Andy Warhol. His paintings are created by simple
silk-screening of the design from commercial boxes and products, and by sub-
sequent exact reproduction of the original." This copying does involve orig-
inality, however, in that Warhol has made it into art, a status which it had not
previously held. However, his practice of signing real Campbell Soup cans
and selling them as art is even more troublesome." In this instance, all the art-
ist has added is his signature, a seemingly minimal quantum of originality.
As viewed by the art critics, however, it is solely through this signature that
an ordinary can is transformed into the work of art, in that the common-
place object thereby becomes the center of the viewer's attention." As his
signature makes this transformation occur, Warhol's minimal contribution is
more than trivial. The variation from a can to a work of art, however accom-
plished, should be sufficient to meet the originality requirement of the copy-
right law."
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is submitted that any form of
pop art should meet both the creativity and originality requirements of the
copyright law. Pop art as copyright material seems to be unique. Pop tech-
nically infringes its source, but is allowed as a fair use. It then qualifies
for its own copyright protection. It is clearly creative art, yet may be an
exact duplicate of a commonplace object or a commercial label. The artist may
have added very little of his own, yet its use as ar-t is original, and it is the
artist who has accomplished this transformation.°5 Under the copyright clef-
57 See Dworkin, Originality in the Law of Copyright, ASCAP Copyright Law
Symposium Number Eleven 60, 71 (1962).
58 See Silvers v. Russell, 113 F. Supp. 119, 123 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
59 Sec Dworkin, supra note 57.
60 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, III U.S. 53, 60 (1884) ; Pagano v.
Chas. Ileseler Co., 234 F. 963, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
6 I L. Lippard, supra note 7, at 82.
82 Id.; Leonard, The Return of Andy Warhol, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1968, § 6
(Magazine), at 32.
83 Leonard, supra note 62.
84 Cf. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951) ;
Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945).
65 See Hess, supra note 35.
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inition, anything artistic and original is copyrightable; under the pop art
definition, the sole requirement for a work of art is intent, so that anything
can be art, whether truly original or not cu
IV. INFRINGEMENT OF POP ART COPYRIGHTS
Since early 1968, pop art has been commercialized through the mass
production and sale of household objects, such as pillows and china, with
pop-type designs imprinted on them. These pop art objects fall generally into
two categories, those involving the exact subject matter which has been dis-
played in pop art, and those which employ subject matter which has never
been artistically treated."" If pop art is eligible for copyright protection,"
this new, highly profitable business trend may constitute an infringement of
the artist's copyright.
Whether "pop objects" are infringing any pop art copyright will depend
upon the nature of the protection allowed. To show infringement, the artist
must prove that there was copying from his work and that the copying in-
volved an improper appropriation." Pop art raises serious problems as to
both elements necessary for infringement.
In the production of pillows and china employing a design used both on
a commercial product, such as Campbell Soup cans, and in a work of pop art
by Andy Warhol, it is unclear exactly what is being copied. There is no violation
of artistic copyright simply because of similarity between the paintings and
pop objects, as the similarity can result from the fact that both works deal
with the same subject.'" There must be some form of copying of the copy-
righted material for there to be any infringement." Others are not precluded
by the copyright from copying the source of the copyrighted work." Thus a
pop object manufacturer might attempt to circumvent the copyright pro-
visions by using the artist's original source as the model instead of copying
the protected work itself. For example, in its production of "pop" Campbell
Soup mugs and bowls, the manufacturer may simply copy from the can itself
and ignore the Warhol painting of it. Yet this practice seems to be patently
unfair, since the manufacturer is capitalizing upon Warhol's transformation
of the object into art, rather than upon the nature of the can itself. Before
pop art, there was no market for such objects; it was solely the pop art move-
ment that made these objects marketable. In taking advantage of Warhol's
development of their product, Campbell may be modeling their pop objects
on their own can, but it is evident that they are "copying" the Warhol paint-
66 Id.
67 The works copied have mostly been those of Andy Warhol. There have also
been considerable sales of Roy Lichenstein's comic strip frames as posters.
68 Sec pp. 995-99 supra.
69 ArnsLein v. Porter, 1 . 54 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Marcel Paper Mills, Inc.
v. Scott Paper Co., 290 F. Supp. 43, 46-47 (D.N.J. 1968).
70 Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1936).
71 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).
72 Contemporary Arts, Inc. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 193 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir.
1951), aff'd, 344 U.S. 228 (1952).
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ings. If copying of the art is indeed taking place, the availability of common
sources will not be a defense to infringement."
Copying need not be limited to an exact reproduction from the pro-
tected work. An infringing copy may be produced by memory from an orig-
inal.74
 If Campbell had no can from which to work, and simply produced pop
objects from memory of Warhol's works, it would clearly be infringing. Camp-
bell's actual activity differs from this practice only in the respect that it
uses one of its own cans as a model, because this practice makes the repro-
duction more accurate and avoids the technical necessity of copying Warhol's
works. It is submitted that the production of such pop objects is still copying
the pop art adaption. In Gross v. Seligman, 75
 an artist took a photograph,
copyrighted it, and sold all his rights in the work. Later the same artist placed
the same model in a very similar pose, published the photograph thereby ob-
tained. The owner of the first photograph filed suit, alleging that the artist
had infringed his copyright. The court found that the photographs were not
two separate versions of the same subject, but that the first photograph had
been copied by the second." The court concluded that it was irrelevant
whether physical reproduction occurred through the use of the first photo-
graph or the original model, as the artistic conception of the first photograph
had been appropriated.77
The production of such objects as Campbell Soup mugs and bowls and
Brillo Pillos (sic) presents an analogous situation. In commercial production
of such pop objects, the manufacturer has appropriated the artistic concep-
tion of the original art works." If the principles enunciated in Gross v. Selig-
man are still good law, then the pop objects are copies of the pop art,
regardless of whether the model used was the art work itself or the original
commercial source for the art."
Even if the pop objects are considered to have been copied from the pop
art, to constitute infringement there must still be an improper appropriation."
Possible justification for the appropriation may be the material difference in
form between pop objects and pop art.
Copyright protection, unlike that for patents, does not extend to the
idea of the work, but only to that mode of expression embodied in the par-
ticular work copyrighted. 81
 While the treatment of the particular subject as
art is protected, the idea of commonplace objects as ornamental cannot be. 82
This idea-expression distinction, however, fails to define conclusively the
scope of copyright protection. In most areas, the protection has been found
73
 Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
74
 Freudenthal v. Hebrew Publishing Co., 44 F. Supp. 754, 755 (S.DX.Y. 1942).
75 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914).
76
 Id. at 931. Cf. Champney v. Haag, 121 F, 944 (E.D. Pa. 1903).
77 Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1914).
78
 See Brooks v. Religious Tract Society, 45 W.R. 476 (1897), quoted in W. Copinger
& F. Skone James, Copyright 179 (9th ed. 1958).
7
" Cf. Pellegrini v. Allegrini, 2 F.2d 610 (E.D. Pa. 1924).
80 See cases cited note 69 supra.
81 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ; Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
262 F. Supp. 737, 738 (D. Mass. 1967).
82
 Cf. King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924).
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to extend only to the concrete aspects of the expression, and not to the ab-
straction of the work." In the application of such a standard to pop art, only
the particular treatment of the subject would be protected from copying, and
a different "pop" use of the same subject would probably not infringe. 84 In ,
the field of artistic copyright, however,, the protection seems to extend fur-
ther into the abstraction of the expression than in other areas. 85 In King Fea-
tures Syndicate v. Fleischer," the court found that the concept of beauty, as
expressed in the art work, was protected, since that aspect of the work was
the conception of the artist's genius. 87 In one English case,88 protection was
allowed for the "feeling and artistic character" of the work, as distinguished
from the figures as treated in the work itself.
This abstraction seems justified by the nature of the subject to be pro-
tected. The essential ingredient of art is the idea expressed. Under a narrow
interpretation of the area of protection, the essence of the subject matter as
art could easily be appropriated through the use of a similar theme. Under
such circumstances, copyrighting a work of art will provide little practical
benefit. If, on the other hand, a broad interpretation is employed for artistic
protection, then copyrighting will prevent not only exact copying, but also
any use of the subject matter that goes so far into the expression as to appro-
priate its essence."
Nor should artistic protection be limited by the particular medium of ex-
pression of the art. The copyright holder should have the exclusive right to.
transform his work into any other medium." Any copying of protected work
in a different medium omits the artist's effort, but still appropriates his
genius."' Since the Copyright Act was intended to protect the creation of the
general form and its value in that form,"2 an original artistic work should be
protected against copying in different media" 2 and in different dimensions."
A change from painting on canvass to printing on china and pillows presents
nothing more than a change in media, as it retains the essential form as art.
Any such change would therefore be an improper appropriation, as it inter-
83 National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 600
(2d Cir. 1951); Dunham v. General Mills, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 152, 153-54 (D. Mass.
1953).
84 Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926).
85 See Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 174 F. Supp. 733, 736 (S.D. Cal.
1959), modified, 287 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 801 (1961).
86 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924).
87 Id. at 536.
88 Brooks v. Religious Tract Society, 45 W.R. 476 (1897), quoted in W. Copinger &
F. Skone James, Copyright 179 (9th ed. 1958).
89 See National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594,
600 (2d Cir. 1951).
99 Note, Protection of the Artist and Sculptor Under the Law of Copyrights, 22
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 709, 718 (1961).
91 King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1924).
92 Id. at 537.
93 Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 1957);
M.J. Golden & Co. v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 137 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Falk
v. T.P. Howell & Co., 37 F. 202 (S.D,N.Y. 1888).
94 Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich Inc., 5 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934).
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feres with the artist's exclusive right to produce the work in any manner or
medium."
Other factors may play an important role in the determination whether
the appropriation of the copyrighted pop art was improper. Pop objects are
utilitarian in nature, while the original pop work is intended to be pure art.
Yet the courts have found that art may be infringed by a purely utilitarian
object.°° It should also be 'irrelevant that it may be Campbell or Brillo, the
producer of the original labels, who is infringing the pop art based upon its
product, since they are actually copying someone else's protected illlustra-
tion of it."
From this analysis, it appears that a manufacturer's production of pop
objects previously developed and copyrighted as art is an improper appropri-
ation, one that infringes the artist's copyright. This view does not mean that
all pop objects will necessarily infringe. Many involve products never level=
oped as pop art by any artist. These works employ only the pop idea of
transforming the commonplace into art. For such works, there is use of an
artist's idea only in its most basic form, and no appropriation of the concrete
means used by an artist." Thus, a copyrighted soup can painting will be
infringed by a pop object of a soup can, but will not be infringed by a NoDoz
Pillow based upon the latter product's design. With this distinction, copyright
law can protect the actual embodiment of the artist's idea without expanding
protection to the idea itself.
V. CONCLUSION
The peculiar nature of pop art challenges the application of many of
the standards traditionally used in copyright determinations. It is pro-
duced as an allowable infringement, a fair use, and then may itself be eligible
for protection against copying by the very people who created the source for
the art. This result arises from pop's own ability to be copyrighted. While the
copyright element of creativity has been reduced to the requirement of status
as a work of art, pop has developed art to the stage where intent is sufficient
to make anything art." The logical conclusion from this art-law conflict of
terminology would be that anything could be copyrighted as art by the sim-
ple act of definition. Such a conclusion may be necessary if the law is to keep
pace with developments in the arts; it is untenable as a legal standard, how-
ever, as it completely vitiates creativity as a requirement.
Similar difficulties arise with the copyright originality requirement. While
"35 Sec Note, supra note 90, at 718, 721. Under the proposed Copyright Law Re-
vision, copyright protection subsists in works "fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion," and this protection includes the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based
on the copyrighted work. H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 102, 106(2) (1967),
1-)6 Home Art, Inc. v. Glcnsder Textile Corp., 81 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
Under the proposed Copyright Law Revision, the exclusive right to reproduce a copy-
righted work of art "includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any kind of
article, whether useful or otherwise." H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 113(a) (1967).
17 Blumcraft v. Newman Bros., Inc., 373 F.2d 905, 909 (6th Cir. 1967).
98 See Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926) ; Gave v. Gillis, 167 F.
Supp. 416, 418 (D. Mass. 1958).
" See Hess, supra note 35.
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the law requires that the work "owe its origin to the artist,""° the major artistic
aspect of pop art is its unoriginality. The pop artist is attempting to create
art indistinguishable from the original subject matter, and thereby evoke an
emotional as well as a visual response."' Thus the originality requirement is
another instance where the law has failed to stay apace with new develop-
ments in the arts.
Finally, the commercial production of pop objects represents an obvious
appropriation of the artist's work. Yet this appropriation may occur without
infringement if the copying is done from the model used by the artist, the
original product, instead of from the art itself. To avoid this result, it may be
necessary to redefine copying under the copyright law to include such in-
direct borrowing as has occurred in the creation of pop objects. Unless the
law is liberalized in this area, the ability to copyright such works of art will
provide no protection at all.
Many apparent inconsistencies have arisen between the copyright law as
it has evolved and the protection which the law was intended to provide.
While copyright was designed to promote the arts through the granting of
exclusive rights, 102 new art forms may lack this protection because the de-
veloped rules have failed to consider the possible ramifications of future
artistic developments. Pop art presents perhaps the most blatant example of
this problem. Since a basic reexamination of our copyright system is now un-
der way, it is suggested that any intended revision of the copyright law take
into account not only the doctrinal problems which have developed under
the copyright law, but also the basic changes which have taken place in the
fields to be protected.
WILLIAM 13. SNEIRSON
100 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) ;
Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 117 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
101 J. Rublowsky, Pop Art 110, 116 (1965). This effect is intended to be similar
to Brecht's alienation effect in the theater. See Hess, note 35,
102 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
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